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Abstract. Biometric-based remote user authentication is a useful prim-
itive that allows an authorized user to authenticate to a remote server
using his biometrics. Leakage attacks, such as side-channel attacks, allow
an attacker to learn partial knowledge of secrets (e.g., biometrics) stored
on any physical medium. Leakage attacks can be potentially launched to
any existing biometric-based remote user authentication systems. Fur-
thermore, applying plain biometrics is an eﬃcient and straightforward
approach when designing remote user authentication schemes. How-
ever, this approach jeopardises user’s biometrics privacy. To address
these issues, we propose a novel leakage-resilient and privacy-preserving
biometric-based remote user authentication framework, such that regis-
tered users securely and privately authenticate to an honest-but-curious
remote server in the cloud. In particular, the proposed generic frame-
work provides optimal eﬃciency using lightweight symmetric-key cryp-
tography, and it remains secure under leakage attacks. We formalize sev-
eral new security models, including leakage-resilient user authenticity
and leakage-resilient biometrics privacy, for biometric-based remote user
authentication, and prove the security of proposed framework under stan-
dard assumptions.
Keywords: Remote user authentication · Leakage-resilient
Biometrics privacy · Generic framework
1 Introduction
User authentication is the ﬁrst line of defense in most information systems.
While password-based user authentication is still pervasive, it triggers increasing
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concerns over security (e.g., password leakage and correlated passwords) and
usability (e.g., many passwords for each user to remember and frequent update of
passwords). To address these concerns, biometrics based user authentication has
become increasingly popular in practice in recent years. We focus on biometric-
based remote user authentication in this work.
Biometrics (such as face, ﬁngerprint, iris and voice) based remote user
authentication may be vulnerable to some leakage attacks in the real world,
such as “side channel attacks” on computation time, power consumption, radi-
ation/noise/heat emission. An attacker is able to obtain some imperfect infor-
mation of the secrets (e.g., biometrics) stored at either user or remote server’s
side. Speciﬁcally, if an impersonator is able to obtain imperfect/partial knowl-
edge of one user’s biometrics stored in cloud, then user’s authenticity may be
compromised. To capture such leakage attacks in biometrics-based remote user
authentication setting is the main motivation of this work.
Furthermore, we consider user’s biometrics as a secret value in this work.
One may argue that biometrics is public information [2,7,28] such as face or
ﬁngerprint, but certain liveness detection systems in the literature [24,32] con-
ﬁrmed that biometrics acts as a secret key for (remote) user authentication. In
particular, we consider biometrics privacy against an honest-but-curious remote
cloud server.
The proposed leakage-resilient and privacy-preserving biometric-based
remote user authentication framework has the following properties: (1) user’s
secret biometrics is hidden to the public; (2) user relies on encryption tech-
nique to protect biometrics, the encryption key is permanently stored locally
and user’s encrypted biometrics is stored in remote cloud; (3) user’s encryption
key and encrypted biometrics remain secure under certain leakage attacks.
The proposed biometrics-based and privacy-preserving remote user authen-
tication framework is signiﬁcantly useful in many real-world applications. We
take mobile device users enrolling/logging in a service provider in cloud as an
example, where they have their respective roles (i.e., client and server). The
user authenticity of proposed framework assists in ensuring that a registered
user and the remote service provider are performing authentication successfully
using encrypted biometrics that are stored in cloud. In other words, user authen-
ticity aims to capture impersonation attacks performed by outsider attackers.
The biometrics privacy prevents the honest-but-curious remote service provider
from revealing the registered user’s secret biometrics. Furthermore, these afore-
mentioned attacks will not be successful under the leakage of secret values.
1.1 This Work
In this work, we introduce the notion of leakage-resilient and privacy-preserving
biometric-based remote user authentication (LR-BUA), allowing registered users
authenticate to an honest-but-curious remote server using biometrics, and at the
same time ensuring leakage resilience to any secrets stored on physical medium
and privacy protection on biometrics. Our contributions can be summarized as
follows.
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– We present the formal security deﬁnitions for biometrics-based and privacy-
preserving remote user authentication schemes. In particular, we propose a
user authenticity model to capture impersonation attacks, and a biometrics
privacy model to address an honest-but-curious remote server.
– We present the first leakage-resilient user authenticity security model and bio-
metrics privacy model to capture the computationally hard-to-invert leakage
attacks on all secret values in the auxiliary inputs model.
– We present the first generic construction on leakage-resilient and privacy-
preserving biometric-based remote user authentication, and prove that the
proposed LR-BUA generic construction can achieve leakage-resilient user
authenticity and biometrics privacy under standard assumptions.
– We show the instantiations of all the building blocks. In particular, we present
a lightweight biometrics-based remote user authentication scheme and its
overall performance analysis.
Table 1. A comparative summary of biometrics-based user authentication.
Function/scheme [2] [29] [18] [28] [15] [23] Ours
Biometrics privacy    ×   
†-Factor authenticationa Two One One One Three One Two
Lightweight cryptographyb   × × ×  
Remote user authentication  × ×   × 
Leakage-resilient w.r.t user × × × × × × 
Leakage-resilient w.r.t server × × × × × × 
a† denotes number of factors for authentication/identiﬁcation.
bLightweight Cryptography means symmetric key cryptography (e.g., sym-
metric key encryption [29]) rather than public key cryptography (e.g., homo-
morphic encryption [18,27]).
1.2 Related Work
Biometric-based Authentication. Atallah et al. [2] proposed the ﬁrst
lightweight biometrics-based authentication using cryptographic hash functions,
and formally deﬁned security requirements for biometrics-based authentication
including conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability. Notice that some research
work in the literature [2,7,28] assume that the biometrics is a public value (such
as ﬁngerprint and face), and their privacy concern is the relationship between a
biometric information and user’s real identity.
However, three-factor [15,17] and multi-factor [16] authentication (such as
smart card, password and biometrics) in the literature formed an opposite
research direction, such that biometrics acts as a secret key for (remote) user
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authentication, and the proposed three/multi-factor solutions are able to pro-
vide enhanced security on user authentication. Meanwhile, another research line
[24,32] also conﬁrmed this assumption. One well-known three-factor authentica-
tion was done by Fan and Lin [15], in which an eﬃcient three-factor authenti-
cation with privacy protection on biometrics was proposed, and formally proven
in Bellare and Rogaway’s [4] model. Speciﬁcally, they require user’s biometrics
is not sharing with remote server, and the biometrics matching is performed by
remote server.
Moreover, some research work focused on privacy-preserving (remote) user
biometrics authentication/identiﬁcation, and a few novel solutions [18,23,27,29]
are mainly for biometrics identification in the cloud. For instance, Schoen-
makers and Tuyls [27] proposed to use a homomorphic encryption scheme for
eﬃcient biometric authentication by employing multi-party computation tech-
niques. Wang et al. [29] used invertible matrices as symmetric-key secrets to
encrypt biometrics and the exact biometrics matching are executed in the trans-
formed (i.e., encrypted) domain, namely, transformation-based cancellable bio-
metrics [22]. In Table 1, we compare our proposed solution with typical works
on biometric-based authentication/identiﬁcation to highlights our distinctions: it
shows that our proposed solution is the ﬁrst lightweight biometrics based remote
user authentication with leakage-resilient and biometrics privacy.
“Fast Identity Online” (FIDO) alliance [1] is an industry consortium to
address the lack of interoperability between authentication devices and user
authentication experiences. Speciﬁcally, FIDO is used to enhance user authenti-
cation security (e.g., using biometrics) on local devices, while we focus on remote
biometric-based user authentication in this work.
Modelling Leakage Attacks. Biometrics and secret values used in biometrics-
based user authentication may be subject to leakage attacks. Micali and Reyzin
[25] ﬁrstly introduced a leakage-resilient cryptography model to capture various
side-channel attacks. Speciﬁcally, an adversary is allowed to access a leakage ora-
cle: Adversary can query a polynomial time computable function f , and receive
the output of f(x), where x is user’s secret key. They also put some restrictions
on f(x) such that the adversary is not able to recover the secret key x completely
through the chosen function f , and the amount of leakage f(x) must be less than
|x|. Later on, Naor and Segev [26] relaxed the restriction on f(x), and stated
that the lower bound of leaked bits is conﬁned to the minimal entropy of secret
key x, namely, “noisy leakage” model.
Dodis et al. [12] proposed a more general model: “auxiliary inputs”. Instead
of min-entropy requirement on secret key x, they only require the chosen leakage
functions to be computationally hard to compute x given f(x). The adversary
is allowed to obtain the leakage bits larger than any upper bound that deﬁned
in the bounded/noisy leakage models, and the chosen functions f must “hard-
to-invert”. Notice that leakage-resilient cryptography (e.g., [10,30,31]) has been
extensively studied in the auxiliary inputs model. However, all the previous
leakage-resilient works didn’t address the leakages on secret biometrics in the
(remote) user authentication systems, such as the secret (encrypted) biometrics
116 Y. Tian et al.
stored in the remote server. Furthermore, the leakage attacks on secret biometrics
become more challenging as those encrypted biometrics is a key to the authen-
tication success, and the adversarial capability has not been formally captured
by the existing leakage models.
Fuzzy Extractor. Fuzzy extractor is one of the building blocks for construct-
ing biometric-based remote user authentication in this work. Juels and Watten-
berg [21] introduced a new type of cryptography primitive “fuzzy commitment
scheme”. It is particularly useful for biometric authentication systems because
error-correcting property within a suitable metric. Juels and Sudan [20] proposed
another novel construction “fuzzy vault scheme”. It is based on set distance
rather than hamming distance used in [21]. Speciﬁcally, the fuzzy vault scheme
randomly creates a secret k degree polynomial p(x) during the sketch generation
procedure. Given valid biometric information, a user can reproduce the polyno-
mial and recover x. Dodis et al. [14] formally introduced the notion of secure
sketches and fuzzy extractors, and use biometrics to derive a cryptographic key
for various cryptographic applications, such as password-based authentication.
Recently, Li et al. [23] proposed the ﬁrst fuzzy extractor based biometric
identiﬁcation protocol using a newly built fuzzy extractor, which is focusing on
real number strings with Chebyshev distance. In particular, the proposed fuzzy
extractor is suitable for eﬃcient user identiﬁcation, but its drawback is less error-
tolerance than hamming distance or edit distance. In order to achieve fast remote
user authentication on-line, we implement this succinct fuzzy extractor in our
proposed instantiation scheme.
With regard to speciﬁc attacks on fuzzy extractor, Boyen et al. [6] introduced
a notion called “robust sketches”, and provided a generic conversion to prevent
an active attack, such that adversary can modify the public helper data so as
to compromise the security of secure sketches and fuzzy extractors. Later on,
Canetti et al. [8] presented another notion, namely “reusable fuzzy extractor”
(the prior work is [5]). It addressed an issue that user has multiple sketches from
the same sketch scheme, and his (low-entropy) biometrics information may be
leaked.
2 Security Model
In this section, we ﬁrstly present the system model for biometric-based remote
user authentication, then we present the security models for LR-BUA.
Notation. We deﬁne a system with n users. We denote the i-th session estab-
lished by a user as ΠiU , and identities of all the users recognised by Π
i
U during the
execution of that session by partner identiﬁer pidiU . We deﬁne sid
i
U as the unique
session identiﬁer belonging to the session i established by the user U . Speciﬁcally,
sidiU = {mj}nj=1, where mj ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the message transcript among users.
We say an oracle ΠiU may be used or unused. The oracle is considered as
unused if it has never been initialized. The oracle is initialized as soon as it
becomes part of a group. After the initialisation the oracle is marked as used
Privacy-Preserving Biometric-Based Remote User Authentication 117
Table 2. Summary of notations
Notation Deﬁnition
pki/ski User i’ public key/private key
IDi/IDŜ Identity of user i/server Ŝ
dist(x, y) Distance between vector x and vector y
t ∈ R+ Threshold value (positive real number)
B Biometrics information
C Encrypted biometrics information
TEnc One-way transformation-based encryption scheme
Ext(x, r) Strong extractor
and turns into the stand-by state where it waits for an invocation to execute
a protocol operation. Upon receiving such invocation the oracle ΠiU learns its
partner identiﬁer pidiU and turns into a processing state where it sends, receives
and processes messages according to the description of the protocol. During that
phase, the internal state information stateiU is maintained by the oracle. The ora-
cle ΠiU remains in the processing state until it collects enough information to
ﬁnalise the user authentication. As soon as the authentication is accomplished
ΠiU accepts and terminates the protocol execution meaning that it would not
send or receive further messages. If the protocol execution fails then ΠiU ter-
minates without having accepted. In addition, we present the commonly used
notations (see Table 2) in this paper.
2.1 System Model
In this work, we present a biometric-based remote user authentication system
involving two entities: user and cloud server. We then deﬁne a biometric-based
remote user authentication framework which consists of the following algorithms:
– Registration. This is an algorithm that executed between a user and a cloud
server Ŝ in a secure channel. User registers his identity ID along with a
reference biometric information B1 to cloud server Ŝ.
– Authentication. This is an interactive algorithm between a registered user and
a cloud server Ŝ in a public channel. User sends his identity ID and speciﬁc
information associates with a candidate biometric information B′ to cloud
server Ŝ, while Ŝ accept it if and only if t′ = dist(B′,B) ≤ t.
2.2 Security Model
We deﬁne a formal user authenticity model to capture the impersonation
attacks performed by outsider adversaries, and a formal biometrics privacy
1 Reference biometrics can be interpreted as either encrypted biometrics [9] or plain
biometrics.
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model to capture an honest-but-curious server for biometric-based authentica-
tion/identiﬁcation protocols. Furthermore, we extend both user authenticity and
biometrics privacy models to the leakage-resilient against auxiliary inputs models
for tackling leakage attacks, such as side-channel attacks.
Authenticity. Informally, an adversary A attempts to impersonate a registered
user and authenticate to a cloud server. We then deﬁne a formal authenticity
game between a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A and a simu-
lator S (i.e., challenger) as follows.
– Setup. S ﬁrst generates identity/static key pair (IDi, ski) for n users and an
identity IDŜ for cloud server in the system, where ski denotes the secret key of
user i. In addition, S honestly generates user’s reference biometric information
{Bi}. Eventually, S sends user/cloud server’s identities ({IDi}, IDŜ) to A.
– Training. A can make the following queries in arbitrary sequence to S.
• Send: If A issues a send query in the form of (U, i,m) to simulate a network
message for the i-th session of user U , then S would simulate the reaction
of instance oracle ΠiU upon receiving message m, and return to A the
response that ΠiU would generate; If A issues a send query in the form of
(U , ‘start’), then S creates a new instance oracle ΠiU ′ and returns to A
the ﬁrst protocol message.
• Biometric Reveal: If A issues a biometric reveal query to user i, then S
returns user i’s reference biometric information Bi to A.
• Static Key Reveal: If A issues a static key reveal (or corrupt, for short)
query to user i, then S returns user i’s static secret key ski (e.g., static
key stored in ROM) to A.
• State Reveal: If A issues a state reveal query to (possibly unaccepted)
instance oracle ΠjUi (j = i), then S will return all internal state values
(e.g., ephemeral key stored in RAM) contained in ΠjUi at the moment the
query is asked.
– Attack. A wins the game if all of the following conditions hold.
• S accept user i; It implies sids
Ŝ
exists.
• A did not issue Biometric Reveal query with regard to user i;
• mi ∈ sidsŜ , but there exists no ΠsUi which has sent mi (mi denotes the
message transcript from user i)2.
We deﬁne the advantage of an adversary A in the above game as
AdvBUAA (λ) = |Pr[Awins]|.
Deﬁnition 1. We say a biometric-based remote user authentication (BUA)
scheme has authenticity if for any PPT A, AdvBUAA (λ) is a negligible function
of the security parameter λ.
2 We do not consider the collude attack between an impersonator and a curious server
in this work.
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Biometrics Privacy. Informally, an adversary (i.e., server) attempts to learn
user’s plain biometrics. Below is the biometrics privacy game between an adver-
sary A and a simulator S.
– Setup: S ﬁrst generates the identity/static key pair (IDi, ski) for n user in
the system, where ski denote the secret key of user i. In addition, S honestly
generates user’s reference biometric information {Ci}3. Eventually, S sends
user’s identities {IDi} to A. We denote the original n users set as U .
– Training: A is allowed to issue Send, Biometric reveal, State reveal and at most
n-1 Static key reveal queries to S. We denote the honest (i.e., uncorrupted)
user set as U ′.
– Challenge: S randomly selects a reference biometrics information Ci (IDi ∈
U ′) as challenge candidate, and send it to A. A wins the game if Bi ← A(Ci).
We then deﬁne the advantage of an adversary A in the above game as
AdvBUAA (λ) = |Pr[A wins]|. (1)
Deﬁnition 2. We say a BUA scheme has biometrics privacy if for any PPT
A, AdvBUAA (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
Authenticity Against Auxiliary Inputs. To model the leakage on both the
biometric information and the static key with respect to auxiliary inputs, we
ﬁrst deﬁne a set of admissible functions H. According to the work of Dodis et al.
[12], we deﬁne two classes of auxiliary input leakage functions below.
– Let How(bio) be the class of all the polynomial-time computable func-
tions h : {0, 1}|bio| → {0, 1}∗, such that given h(bio) (for a randomly
generated biometric information bio), no PPT adversary can ﬁnd bio with
probability ≥ bio. The function h(bio) can be viewed as a composition of
qbio ∈ N+ functions, i.e., h(bio) = (h1(bio), · · · , hqbio(bio)) where for all
i ∈ {1, · · · , qbio}, hi ∈ How(bio).
– Let How(sta) be the class of all the polynomial-time computable functions h :
{0, 1}|sta| → {0, 1}∗, such that given h(sta) (for a randomly generated static
key sta), no PPT adversary can ﬁnd sta with probability ≥ sta. The function
h(sta) can be viewed as a composition of qsta ∈ N+ functions, i.e., h(sta) =
(h1(sta), · · · , hqsta(sta)) where for all i ∈ {1, · · · , qsta}, hi ∈ How(sta).
We then present the new security model, i.e., leakage-resilient biometric-based
user authenticity model (LR-BUA), which is an extension of previous authen-
ticity model. Speciﬁcally, we provide two leakage queries for A in the LR-BUA
model.
– Biometric Leakage: If A issues a biometric leakage query to user i (i.e., Obio(i)),
then S returns fBio(Bi) to A, where fBio ∈ How(bio), and Bi denotes the
reference biometric information of user i.
3 The secret key is used to protect biometrics, such as Ci ← F (ski,Bi), where F
denotes a one-way function.
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– Static Key Leakage: If A issues a static key leakage query to user i (i.e.,
Osta(i)), then S returns fSta(Stai) to A, where fSta ∈ How(sta), and Stai
denotes the static key of user i.
A General Trivial Attack. Consider an adversary is allowed to reveal user’s
secret key Sta in the LR-BUA model, she then can launch a trivial attack by
encoding the reference derivation function into the leakage function of fSta, hence
obtains biometrics information Bi and wins the leakage-resilient user authenticity
game. Similarly, an adversary can launch another trivial attack by encoding the
static key derivation function into the leakage function of fBio if user’s reference
biometrics is revealed, which is corresponding to the leakage-resilient biometrics
privacy game below.
Our Treatment. In our proposed leakage-resilient biometric-based user authen-
ticity model, we ask the adversary to submit two leakage function sets FBio ⊆
How(bio),FSta ⊆ How(sta), where both FBio and FSta are polynomial in the
security parameter λ, prior to game Setup which is observed in [10]. During
the LR-BUA security game, A is allowed to adaptively access both biomet-
ric leakage oracle fBio and static key leakage oracle fSta. We require that
fBio ∈ FBio, fSta ∈ FSta and A is not allowed to leak reference biometric infor-
mation Bi entirely. We deﬁne the advantage of an adversary A in the LR-BUA
game as
AdvLR−BUAA (λ) = |Pr[A wins]|.
Deﬁnition 3. We say a BUA scheme has leakage-resilient authenticity if for
any PPT A, AdvLR−BUAA (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
Biometrics Privacy Against Auxiliary Inputs. In this extended biomet-
rics privacy against auxiliary inputs model, A is additionally allowed to access
challenge user’s Static Key Leakage oracle Osta(i), and A is not allowed to leak
static secret key ski entirely. We follow the same treatment described above and
deﬁne the advantage of an adversary A in the biometrics privacy game as
AdvLR−BUAA (λ) = |Pr[A wins]|. (2)
Deﬁnition 4. We say a BUA scheme has leakage-resilient biometrics privacy
if for any PPT A, AdvLR−BUAA (λ) is a negligible function of the security
parameter λ.
3 Our Construction
In this section, we present the proposed generic fuzzy extractor that will be used
in the proposed generic construction, and present our proposed LR-BUA generic
framework and security analysis respectively.
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3.1 Generic Fuzzy Extractor
We present a generic fuzzy extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs, which
is built on top of a (robust)4 secure sketch [14] and a (δ, )-strong extractor with
hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs [10,12,31].
Deﬁnition 5. A generic fuzzy extractor with -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs
consists of two randomised procedures (Gen,Rep) with the following properties.
– Gen: Let SS be a secure sketch and Ext be a strong extractor with -hard-
to-invert auxiliary inputs. Given an input x, Gen(x; r1, r2) → (P,R), such
that
P = (SS(x; r1), r2), R = Ext(x; r2).
– Rep: Given an noisy input x′ and P , recover the original input x = Rec(x′,
SS(x; r1)), then compute R = Ext(x; r2).
Theorem 1. The proposed generic fuzzy extractor with -hard-to-invert auxil-
iary inputs is secure if the (robust) secure sketch is secure and the (δ, )-strong
extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs is secure.
The security of proposed generic fuzzy extractor is based on the statistical indis-
tinguishability of two distributions below.
|Pr[A(r2, f(x),SS(x; r1),Ext(x; r2)) = 1]|
−|Pr[A(r2, f(x),SS(x; r1), u) = 1]| < δ
Where x, r1 ∈R {0, 1}l1 , r2 ∈R {0, 1}l2 , u ∈R {0, 1}m and f ∈ How().
Proof. We use (δ, )-strong extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs to
derive the strong extractor Ext from the proposed generic fuzzy extractor. The
(δ, )-strong extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs can guarantee the
security of such (leakage-resilient) strong extractor of proposed generic fuzzy
extractor. In other words, the output string Ext(x; r2) is statistically indistin-
guishable with a string u which is generated uniformly at random, even if a
leakage function f is provided. Furthermore, the secure sketch SS(x; r1) is secure
due to the fact that adversary can recover x with a negligible advantage [14].
Therefore, the proposed generic fuzzy extractor with -hard-to-invert auxiliary
inputs is secure.
Remark. The proposed fuzzy extractor with -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs
is a stronger assumption than a generic fuzzy extractor deﬁned in [14], which
allows adversary to access a leakage function f (adaptively). We stress that
4 It can detect the modiﬁcation of helper data Pi over public channel (secure in the
random oracle model), please refer to [6,13,23] for detailed generic construction of
robust secure sketch.
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the proposed fuzzy extractor with -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs is a generic
construction (i.e., without concrete construction). To this end, Dodis et al. [12]
constructed the ﬁrst reusable (and robust) extractor with hard-to-invert auxil-
iary inputs at the non-fuzzy case (i.e., without helper data and Rep algorithm, or
when x = x′, where x′ denotes a noisy input). Meanwhile, as stated by Canetti et
al. [8], most constructions of fuzzy extractor are not reusable (except [5,8]), and
adding error-correcting codes to a strong extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary
inputs at the fuzzy case (i.e., when x = x′) is a challenging task.
3.2 Generic Framework
High-level Description. User submits his/her reference biometrics to a remote
server during registration phase; Remote server then acknowledges user’s authen-
ticity if and only if user’s candidate biometrics is statistically “close” to his/her
reference biometrics during authentication phase. We deﬁne a collision-resistant
hash function as H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq, a strong extractor with 2-hard-to-invert
auxiliary inputs Ext2 : {0, 1}l′1(λ) × {0, 1}l′2(λ) → {0, 1}m2(λ) and a generic fuzzy
extractor with 1-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs (Ext1 : {0, 1}l1(λ)×{0, 1}l2(λ) →
{0, 1}m1(λ)) in the system.
Fig. 1. Authentication. (public channel)
– Registration. A user i performs below.
1. Generate a biometric information Bi, and a secret key ski along with a
public randomness ri; Note that user i takes ski as a secret key and stores
it locally.
2. Compute an encryption key sk′i = Ext2(ski; ri) using fuzzy extractor with
2-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs Ext2;
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3. Compute the reference biometrics Ci = TEnc(sk′i,Bi), and sends
(IDi, Ci, ri) to a cloud server Ŝ.
Note that cloud server Ŝ takes/stores reference biometrics Ci as a shared
secret key with user i, and the registered user erases sk′i after the generation
of reference biometrics.
– Authentication. The interaction between a registered user and cloud server
performs as follows (see Fig. 1).
• Upon receiving a request IDi from user i, cloud server Ŝ performs below.
1. Compute the challenge nonces rS1 , rS2 ;
2. Run the generic fuzzy extractor with 1-hard-to-invert auxil-
iary inputs to obtain (Pi, ri) ← Gen(Ci; rS1 , rS2), where Pi =
(SS(Ci; rS1), rS2), ri = Ext1(Ci; rS2);
3. Send (Pi, ri) to user i.
• Then user i performs below.
1. Generate
a candidate biometric information Bc and compute Cc = TEnc
(sk′i,Bc), where encryption key sk′i = Ext2(ski; ri) is computed using
locally stored secret key ski and public randomness ri;
2. Run the generic fuzzy extractor with 1-hard-to-invert auxiliary
inputs to obtain Ci = Rec(Cc, Pi) (Pi = (SS(Ci; rS1), rS2) if and only
if dist(Ci, Cc) ≤ t, and compute ri = Ext1(Ci; rS2);
3. Choose a response nonce r′i and compute the token r
′
c =
H(IDi||r′i||ri||Pi);
4. Erase all state and send (r′c, r
′
i) to cloud server Ŝ.
• Eventually, cloud server Ŝ computes the token rc = H(IDi||r′i||ri||Pi) and
checks r′c
?=rc. If it does hold, accept; Otherwise, reject.
3.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 2. The proposed LR-BUA achieves leakage-resilient authenticity
(Deﬁnition 3) in the random oracle model if the generic fuzzy extractor with
1-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs is secure, where 1 is negligible.
High-Level Discussion. Before we present detailed security proof, we clarify
the motivation of each game for leakage-resilient user authenticity security. Game
G1 is used to prevent replay attacks; Game G2 is used to capture an adversary,
who is allowed to reveal the static key of user i, aims to impersonate corrupted
user i to authenticate to a remote server Ŝ.
Proof. We deﬁne a sequence of games {Gi} and let AdvLR−BUAi denote the
advantage of the adversary in game Gi. Assume that A activates at most m
sessions in each game.
– G0: This is the original game for leakage-resilient authenticity security.
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– G1: This game is identical to game G0 except that S will abort if chal-
lenge/response nonce (i.e., rS∈ , r
′
i) is used twice by the server/user in two
diﬀerent sessions. Therefore, we have
∣
∣AdvLR−BUA0 − AdvLR−BUA1
∣
∣ ≤ m2/2λ (3)
– G2: This game is identical to game G1 except that in the “Attack”session,
S replaces the real value ri by a random value R ∈ {0, 1}m1(λ) with regard
to instance oracle ΠiUi . Below we show the diﬀerence between G1 and G2
is negligible under the assumption that the generic fuzzy extractor with 1-
hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs is secure.
Let S denote an adversary, who is given (r, f1(Ci), · · · , fqBio(Ci),SS
(Ci; r1), Tb), aims to break the generic fuzzy extractor with 1-hard-to-invert
auxiliary inputs. S simulates the game for A as follows.
• Setup. S sets up the game for A by creating n users with the corresponding
identity, secret key and public randomness {IDi, ski, ri}. S randomly
selects an index i and guesses that the “Attack” event will happen with
regard to user i. In addition, S honestly generates rest user’s biometrics
information {Bj}nj =i and their corresponding reference biometrics {Cj}.
It is obvious that S can answer all the queries made by A except user i
(w.r.t. reference biometrics Ci). Below we mainly focus on the simulation
of user i only.
• Training. S answers A’s queries as follows.
– If A issues a send query in the form of IDi to S w.s.t instance oracle
ΠiUi , S forwards it to his challenger and obtains a helper data Pi
(where Pi = (SS(Ci; r1), r), and (r1, r) are chosen by his challenger),
and returns (Pi, ri) to A as the query response. Note that ri is the
public randomness chosen by S.
If A issues a send query in the form of (Pi, ri) to S, S randomly
chooses a response nonce r′i and sets ri = Tb; S then computes the
token r′c = H(IDi||ri||ri||Pi) and returns (r′c, r′i) to A. Note that Tb
can be either T0 = Ext1(Ci; r) or T1 ∈R {0, 1}m1(λ).
– If A issues a static key leakage query to user i, then S randomly
chooses a leakage function fSta ∈ FSta ⊆ How(2) and returns
fSta(ski) to A as the leakage query outputs. Note that A is allowed
to reveal ski entirely.
– If A issues a biometric leakage query to user i, then S returns f1(Ci),
· · · , fqBio(Ci) as the leakage query outputs.
– If A issues a state reveal query to an instance oracle ΠiUi , then S
returns (r′i, r) to A.
If the challenge of S is T0 = Ext1(Ci; r), then the simulation is consistent
with G1; Otherwise, the simulation is consistent with G2. If the advantage
of A is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in G1 and G2, then S can break the generic
fuzzy extractor with 1-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. Therefore we have
∣
∣AdvLR−BUA1 − AdvLR−BUA2
∣
∣ ≤ n · m · AdvExt1S (λ) (4)
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– G3 This game is identical to game G2 except that in the “Attack” session,
we replace the token r′c by a random value R. Since we model H as a random
oracle, if the replay attacks (w.r.t., G1) and impersonation attacks (w.r.t.,
G2) did not happen, then we have
AdvLR−BUA2 = Adv
LR−BUA
3
It is easy to see that in game G3, A has no advantage, i.e.,
AdvLR−BUA3 = 0 (5)
Combining the above results together, we have
AdvLR−BUAA (λ) ≤ m2/2λ + n · m · AdvExt1S (λ)
Theorem 3. The proposed LR-BUA achieves leakage-resilient biometrics pri-
vacy (Deﬁnition 4) if Ext2 is a strong extractor with 2-hard-to-invert auxiliary
inputs, where 2 is negligible.
Proof. Let S denote an adversary, who is given (r, f1(ski), · · · , fqSta(ski), Tb),
aims to break the strong extractor with 2-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. S
simulates the game for A as follows.
– Setup. S sets up the game for A by creating n users with the corresponding
identity/biometric {IDi,Bi}. S randomly selects an index i and guesses that
the challenge reference biometrics C∗ will happen with regard to user i. In
addition, S honestly generates rest user’s secret key and public randomness
pair {skj , rj}nj =i and their corresponding reference biometrics {Cj}. Eventu-
ally, S sends all the reference biometrics (include C∗) to A. It is obvious that
S can answer all static secret reveal queries made by A except user i. Below
we mainly focus on the simulation of user i only.
– Training. S answers A’s queries as follows.
• If A issues a send query in the form of (Pi, r) to S, then S performs the
simulation as follows. Firstly, S chooses the response randomness r′i, and
computes the challenge reference biometrics C∗ = TEnc(Tb,Bi); Secondly,
S runs the generation of generic fuzzy extractor to obtain (Pi, ri) ←
Gen(Ci; ri1, ri2), where Pi denotes a helper date and ri = Ext1(Ci; r), and
(ri1, ri2) are randomly chosen by S; Eventually, S computes the token
r′c = H(IDi||r′i||ri||Pi) and sends (r′c, r′i) to A as the query response. Note
that Tb can be either T0 = Ext2(ski; r) or T1 ∈R {0, 1}m2(λ).
We assume user i may use same ski,Bi with diﬀerent public randomness
r∗ = ri at most n(λ) times (where n is a polynomial in the security
parameter λ) for generating diﬀerent references during registration. For
instance, C∗i = TEnc(sk∗i ,Bi), sk∗i = Ext2(ski; r∗).
• If A issues a static key leakage query to user i, then S returns f1(ski), · · · ,
fqSta(ski) as the leakage query outputs.
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• If A issues a state reveal query to an instance oracle ΠiUi , then S returns
(r′i, ri2) to A.
Finally, S outputs whatever A outputs. If A guesses the random bit correctly,
then S can break the strong extractor with 2-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs.
Hence, we have
AdvLR−BUAA (λ) ≤ n(λ) · AdvExt2S (λ) (6)
4 Instantiation
In this section, we ﬁrst present a lightweight biometric-based remote user authen-
tication scheme using an eﬃcient fuzzy extractor proposed in [23]. We then
present the performance analysis and eﬃciency analysis respectively. Note that
the work in [31] showed that a strong extractor with auxiliary inputs can be con-
structed from the modiﬁed Goldreich-Levin theorem (refer to [31] for detailed
instantiation).
4.1 The Lightweight Biometric-Based Remote User Authentication
Scheme
We present a lightweight and eﬃcient biometric-based remote user authentica-
tion scheme below.
– Registration. A user i performs below.
1. Generate a biometric information vector Bi = [bi1, bi2, · · · , bin] (bi ∈ Zq);
2. Choose an encryption key sk′i ∈R {0, 1}n|q|;
3. Compute the reference biometric information Ci = sk′i ⊕ Bi and send
(IDi, Ci) to cloud server Ŝ.
– Authentication. The interaction between a user and the cloud server performs
as follows.
• Upon receiving a request IDi from user i, cloud server Ŝ performs below.
1. Compute a challenge nonce rS ∈ Zp;
2. Run the fuzzy extractor in [23]to obtain (Pi, ri) ← Gen(Ci; rS), where
Pi = (SS(Ci), rS), ri = Ext(Ci; rS);
3. Send Pi to user i.
• Then user i performs below.
1. Generate a candidate biometric information vector Bc = [bc1, bc2, · · · ,
bcn], and computes the candidate biometrics Cc = sk′i ⊕ B;
2. Run the fuzzy extractor in [23] to obtain Ci = Rec(Cc, Pi) (Pi =
(SS(Ci), rS) if and only if dist(Ci, Cc) ≤ t, and compute ri =
Ext1(Ci; rS);
3. Choose a random nonce r′i ∈ Zp and computes the token r′c =
H(IDi||r′i||ri||Pi);
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Candidates: |q| n
Fingerprint [3, 29] 4-8 16-640
Face [33] 4-8 1024 - 16384
Fig. 2. General parameters.
4. Erase all state and send (r′c, r
′
i) to cloud server Ŝ.
• Eventually, cloud server Ŝ computes the token rc = H(IDi||r′i||ri||Pi) and
checks r′c
?=rc. If it does hold, accept; Otherwise, reject.
A Trivial Attack. We notice that both user authenticity and biometric pri-
vacy may suﬀer to brute force attacks. For instance, an adversary may choose
a random candidate biometrics C∗ ∈ {0, 1}n|q| for remote user authentica-
tion. More formally, adversary wins the user authenticity game with probability
(C0n|q|+C
1
n|q|+· · ·Ctn|q|)/2n|q| (C denote the combinatorial number system in the
form of Cnm = m!/n!(m−n)!), which is negligible in terms of security parameters.
4.2 Performance Analysis
This experiment was run on virtual machines (3.6GHz single-core processor
and 6GB RAM memory). In this experiment, we use Fingerprint and Face as
candidates biometrics to initialize biometric-based remote user authentication
scheme (BUA) (see Fig. 2). The experiment assumes that user biometric data
has been converted into the format needed (we focus on real number strings here
because the input requirement of fuzzy extractor [23]), because the representa-
tion (depends on the feature extraction algorithms) of biometric data could be
vary. Without loss of generality, we use simulated data which is independent
from various type of biometrics. We analyze the BUA in terms of computation
cost and communication overhead, and we assume an identity has 256-bit size,
a hash function SHA-256 has 256-bit output size, and the helper data of fuzzy
extractor includes a secure sketch with n · log(k · a+1)-bit output size (Refer to
[23] for detailed description of parameters, such as t, k, a).
– Fingerprint 3a: Typically, the bit length of FingerCode (Refer to [19]) is
ranging from 64 bits to 5120 bits. Speciﬁcally, a proper ﬁngerprint has the
following parameters: 2–5 concentric bands, 4–16 sectors, 2–8 Gabor ﬁlters,
quantised with 4–8 bits and stored with ﬁve diﬀerent orientations [3,19]. Note
that there are two main factors that aﬀect the computation cost: (1) Length
of bi (4–8 bits); (2) Dimension of FingerCode n (16–640).
From Fig. 3a, we can see that the running time increases linearly with whole
size of bit length because the computational cost of fuzzy extractor and XOR
operation are relying on the actual size of biometrics. Furthermore, we take
bi = 4 and n = 640 as a sample FingerCode, it requires about 6.16ms for eﬃ-
cient computation (w.r.t. authentication) on-line. If we assume p = 256, then
server and user has 703-bit and 768-bit communication overhead respectively.
Note that the output size of secure sketch is 447 ≈ 640 · log(4 + 1) bits.
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Fig. 3. Evaluation ﬁndings
– Face 3b: An image pixel is usually quantised to store from 4-bit to 8-bit
length, and the size of image is ranging from 32 × 32 to 128 × 128 with
respect to grayscale image. Note that 32× 32 is the minimal recognised value
of a grayscale image, and 128×128 is a most used image size according to the
experimental results (see Table 3 in [33]). From Fig. 3b, the running time also
increases linearly with whole size of bit length (the same reason as explained
above). We then take bi = 4 and n = 16384 as a sample of face recognition, it
requires about 277.46ms for eﬃcient computation (w.r.t. authentication) on-
line. Furthermore, server and user has 11707-bit and 768-bit communication
overhead respectively, and in particular, the user’ communication overhead
is a constant value. Note that the output size of secure sketch is 11451 ≈
16384 · log(4 + 1) bits.
Remark. Note that some types of biometric data such as iris or an audio record-
ing of a voice, are typically quantised in the binary format [11,32] which can also
be processed using above fuzzy extractor. The reason is that, the input of fuzzy
extractor [23] is actually a ciphertext, which means any speciﬁed format (such
as binary, integer, vector and matrix) will be transformed into a real random
string using XOR operation (recall that bi ∈ Zq).
4.3 Eﬃciency Analysis
We then present an eﬃciency comparison among relevant lightweight biometric-
based and fuzzy-extractor based user authentication and identiﬁcation schemes
in terms of storage costs and computational costs. We consider a two-party
(namely, user and server) setting only for fair comparison.
– Storage cost: Let LB denote the length of biometrics B (e.g., |q|n); LZq denote
the length of element in Zq. In Table 3, user’s storage cost (such as encryption
key or randomness) in our proposed solution is less than [23] since cloud server
stores the encrypted biometrics and the corresponding helper data, and user
does not need to run Gen algorithm during authentication phase. As for the
basic scheme in [29], it requires more storage due to two diagonal matrixes
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are replying on ﬂexible dimension of biometrics. Thus our proposed generic
construction has less storage cost than [23,29] from user’s perspective.
Table 3. Storage costs in various schemes.
Schemes Public/secret key (user) Stored info (server)
[29] (LB + 2)2 (LB + 2)2
[23] LB + LZq LB+2LZq
LR-BUA 2LZq LB+ 3LZq
– Computational cost: Let TMul denote the multiplication operation; TExt
denote the fuzzy extractor; TExt′ denote the strong extractor (non-fuzzy case);
TKG denote the key generation algorithm; TEnc denote the encryption scheme;
TSign denote the digital signature scheme; TH denote the hash function. In
Table 4, user’s computational cost of our proposed construction at registra-
tion phase is larger than [23] since additional encryption Enc algorithm is
required for biometrics privacy and Ext′ is required for preventing leakage
attacks. However, user has less computational cost than [23] during authen-
tication phase. Speciﬁcally, user may perform lightweight Enc algorithm as
above instantiation described, when it compared to the Sign algorithm in [23].
Furthermore, the computational cost of our proposed construction and [23]
are linear, while [29] requires cubic growth of computational cost which is
relying on the dimensional of biometrics. According to the performance anal-
ysis, we can infer that the computational cost in [29] is more eﬃcient than
[23] and LR-BUA at low-dimensional (of biometrics) case, but it performs
worse compared to [23] and LR-BUA at high-dimensional case.
Table 4. Computational costs in various schemes.
Schemes Registration Authentication
[29] O(B3)[TMul] O(B3)[TMul]
[23] O(B)[TExt + TKG] O(B)[TExt + TKG + TSign]
LR-BUA O(B)[TExt′ + TEnc] O(B)[TExt + TExt′ + TEnc + TH]
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a notion of leakage-resilient biometric-based remote
user authentication and its generic framework, and a lightweight instantiation
with overall eﬃciency analysis. We also deﬁned the new formal security models
for leakage-resilient user authenticity and biometrics privacy, and proved the
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security of the proposed generic construction under standard assumptions. We
leave the construction of leakage-resilient and privacy-preserving biometric-based
user authentication against impersonation attacks from multiple remote servers
as our future work.
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